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2. How SHOULD AMERICA ADDRESS THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN
TERRORISTS?
What is the primary threat to American national security? The
answer is in the title: homegrown terrorism. This assessment is
relevant both to the United States and Europe; post-9/11 terrorist
attacks convincingly demonstrate that the modus operandi is acts of
domestic terrorism conducted by citizens (or nationals) of that
country.
The fundamental (but not exclusive) motivation for these acts
of domestic terrorism is religious extremism, largely driven by
religious extremist faith leaders inciting members of their
respective congregations. The threat is not from religion, rather
from religious extremists committing acts of terrorism in their own
countries.

t
Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, with
many thanks to April Cobb (J.D. expected, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University
of Utah, 2012) for preparing the appendices.
1. See Thwarted Terror Plots Against the U.S. Since September 11, 2011, HERITAGE
FOUND.,
http://www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/21764F97F93267BlB76
98EEC4E37A804.gif (illustrating how a majority of the thwarted terror plots since
9/11 have involved individuals residing in the United States) (last visited Apr. 26,
2011).
2. See charts at the end of this section on domestic terrorist attacks in the
United States.
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Homegrown terrorism-whether motivated by religious
extremism or another motivation-raises profoundly disturbing
questions; it suggests the threat is from within, potentially turning
neighbor against neighbor. Nevertheless, that discomfort must not
dissuade national security officials from recognizing the threat and
For example, in the religioustaking mitigation measures.
extremism paradigm, the role of the extremist threat leader is
essential in inciting the religious-extremist actor. Put another way,
the religious-extremist faith leader is inciting religious-extremist
actors in houses of worship.
There are at least two distinct communities at risk from
religious-extremist faith leaders: internal communities (of that
faith) and external communities (of the larger body polity). In the
internal-community paradigm, members at risk would include
child-brides (the Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints), honor killings (extremist Islamic communities), and groupmember, person-specific attacks (assassination of former Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist terrorist). With
respect to the external-community paradigm, the at-risk community
includes larger society deemed to be a legitimate target by the
religious extremist inciter; to that end, terrorist attacks in which
both non-group and group members can both be targets in the
context of randomness of terrorism are legitimate.
Resolving tension between justified surveillance and the cost
associated with such surveillance is a difficult issue; resolving this
tension is, however, essential to adequately protect the community.
Given the direct threats posed by religious-extremist inciters, I
recommend that law enforcement engage in proactive monitoring
and surveillance of houses of worship, to which end I recommend
the following measures:
A. Gather criminal evidence or intelligence information
that the faith leader is inciting terrorist action;
willingness-and
community's
B. Analyze
the
capability-to act in accordance with the incitement;
C. Analyze the faith leader's intent to incite the
congregation as a call to duty;
D. Warn the faith leader that law enforcement has
received evidence or intelligence regarding the
incitement and will conduct surveillance unless the
incitement stops, in conformity with the idea of due
process;
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E. Conduct the surveillance in a manner that least affects
the person of faith's freedom of religion;
F. Enhance cooperation between law enforcement and
clergy;
G. Adopt a heightened probable cause standard
regarding monitoring of houses of worship;
H. Articulate clear guidelines for how monitoring is to be
conducted;
I. Articulate and enforce limits on free speech with
respect to religious extremism.
Conducting surveillance in houses of worship has the potential to
chill participation in religion. Not only may potential members
hesitate to join, but preachers, rabbis, imams and other religious
leaders may not feel free to fully express their messages.
The Supreme Court examined this chilling effect in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson and held that the State of Alabama's
interest in obtaining the NAACP's membership list was superseded
by the constitutional rights of the NAACP members.4 The Court
held that "immunity from state scrutiny of [petitioner's]
membership lists . .. is here so related to the right of [petitioner's]
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to
associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."5 The state's interest in
obtaining the records did not outweigh the enormous potential to
chill association were individual members' names revealed.
However, the potential to chill membership does not
supersede all considerations. Certainly if there is specific evidence
of an imminent threat the government is justified in conducting
surveillance, even at the cost of inhibiting religion by potentially
chilling participation. The question thus becomes where to draw
the line between permissible government surveillance and
Professor Michael McConnell
impermissible surveillance.
suggested the following test:
If the plaintiff can show that a law or governmental
practice inhibits the exercise of his religious beliefs, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the
law or practice is necessary to the accomplishment of
3.
4.
5.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 466.
Id.
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some important (or "compelling") secular objective and
that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective. If the plaintiff meets his burden and the
government does not, the plaintiff is entitled to
exemption from the law or practice at issue.
Protecting the general population is a compelling government
objective; the question is whether monitoring houses of worship is
the least restrictive means available for achieving this objective.
Because of the ethical concerns associated with conducting
surveillance in houses of worship, appropriate probable cause
standards must be determined relevant to surveillance of churches,
mosques, temples, and synagogues. Probable cause is based on the
Fourth Amendment, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
While stereotypes such as "Muslims are dangerous" are clearly
insufficient to support probable cause, the Supreme Court
observed in Illinois v. Gates that "probable cause requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity."8
Thus, while the government cannot rely on stereotypes, once
there is a probability of criminal activity, law enforcement is
justified in conducting surveillance. However, because of the
danger of a chilling effect on the practice of religion, monitoring
houses of worship requires a heightened probable cause. That is,
the traditional probable cause standard is-I suggest-insufficient
for monitoring houses of worship because of the inevitable conflict
with the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution.
However, because of the danger posed by religious extremism-in
particular incitement occurring in houses of worship-it is
necessary to enable law enforcement to monitor and conduct
surveillance. While granting immunity to religion poses a clear
6. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (1990).
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).

8.

462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983).

9.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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danger to society, the Constitution cannot be used as a buttress to
forbid the state from fulfilling its fundamental obligations. A
heightened probable cause standard would resolve this tension.
Enhanced cooperation between law enforcement and clergy
would enable the former to warn the latter regarding suspected
criminal conduct of individual congregants. Furthermore, were
particular clergy engaging in speech deemed capable of inciting
acts of terrorism, open channels of communication would facilitate
law enforcement's ability to minimize a potential chilling effect by
warning faith leaders regarding the potential criminal nature of
their particular speech. That is, by engaging in a proactive
discussion with the faith leader regarding prior speech, the need
for future monitoring would be potentially negated were the clergy
to no longer engage in such speech.
A heightened probable cause standard would enable
monitoring of houses of worship while minimizing any chilling
effect on people of faith. Determining whether previous speech
justifies surveillance in accordance with a heightened probable
cause standard would serve to ensure that surveillance would occur
only when and where it was truly required. This approach would
significantly contribute to a more balanced and nuanced approach
to facilitating law enforcement while protecting the freedom of
religion; a heightened probable cause standard would facilitate
respect for the Free Exercise Clause while ensuring that
government fulfills its primary obligation of protecting the public.
Christopher Slobogin argues it is deceptive for the FBI to
conduct surveillance operations using undercover agents.'o
However, there is a cost with respect to the chilling effect were
agents to sit in church dressed in a manner different from
parishioners and holding pen and pencil while writing the words
spoken by the faith leader. A faith leader with whom I spoke
indicated that, were his church under surveillance, he would prefer
FBI agents remain undercover to reduce the chilling effect. While
arguably this is less transparent, it leads both to better information
Were the FBI's
and minimizes Free Exercise violations.
'oSee Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police,
76. OR. L. REv. 775, 778 (1997) ("Undercover work is by definition deceptive. It
normally involves outright lies. Typically, an undercover agent gives or presents a
fake identity and a fabricated history, denies any involvement with the police, and
engages in any number of other lies.")
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surveillance efforts aimed at a particular parishioner, the enhanced
cooperation referenced above would be particularly important.
Finally, we must re-articulate the limits of speech as they relate
to clergymen. How often do clergy need to incite before law
enforcement moves in? What words justify monitoring?
In
Brandenbergv. Ohio, the Court held:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."
The Court went on to say, "The mere abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as reparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action. ' 2
The authority and power of an extremist religious cleric is,
potentially, extraordinary. Therefore, when we examine the three
prongs of the Brandenburgtest-imminence, likelihood, intent the first two are almost certainly met in the case of an extremist
religious authority determined to encourage his congregation to
act. Sermons regularly addressing various dangers and evils will
ultimately reach a critical mass and the listener's act will become
imminent. A religious listener is likely to obey the words of an
individual he or she views as an ultimate authority on spiritual
matters.
Where does that leave the secular state? Precisely because of
the absolutism of the religious extremist, the state has no choice
but to respond accordingly. Perhaps the fundamental weakness of
my argument is that I am suggesting that the state restrict the rights
of citizens. Perhaps society in response to the examples discussed
above-in order to protect the unprotected-may have no choice
but to consistently and aggressively monitor and prosecute religious
extremists who endanger civil democratic society.

11.

395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).

12.

Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).

13.

Id. at 447.
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Appendix A
Domestic Terrorist Attacks Since September 11, 2001
Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2010, there were 52
domestic terrorist attacks and 34 thwarted domestic terrorist attacks
in the United States.
Methods Used:

%37%
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Motivation For Domestic Terrorist Attacks Since
September 11, 2001
Of the 86 domestic terrorist attacks or attempts in the United States
between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2010, seven
motivating factors have been identified.
The motivation came from support
or opposition to the following
factors:
9%

4%2%
11.

3. IS PRESIDENT OBAMA'S USE OF PREDATOR STRIKES IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS?
Much has been written on U.S. drone policy" and on the
14. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Mar. 8, 2010, at 26-34; Drones II: Second Hearingon Drone Warfare Before the Subcomm.
on Nat'l Security and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony of Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law,
at
available
Law),
of
College
Washington
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1619819&rec=1&srcabs=156
1229; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN
available
at
ed.,
forthcoming),
Bronitt,
CONTEXT
(Simon

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1501144;

Jordan

J.

Paust,

Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in
Pakistan, 19J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010); Afsheen John Radsan & Richard
W. Murphy, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405
(2009); Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 19, 2009, available at

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa fact mayer;
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, The Obama
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Israeli targeted-killing policy;' in my own writings I have argued
that Israel's targeted-killing policy meets international law
standards of preemptive self-defense in the context of operational
counterterrorism, subject to restrictions and criteria articulated
below.
Critical to ascertaining the legality, morality, and effectiveness
of the policy (drone and targeted killing) is analyzing the criteria
implemented with respect to specific operational decisions. Both
policies are predicated on engaging a target defined as legitimate
because of the danger posed by that individual. However, mere
identification of an individual as a legitimate target is insufficient
for a targeted killing/drone decision to be deemed lawful; the
action must be based on person-specific self-defense intended to
prevent future acts of terrorism.
For either policy to be legal it must be dependent on meeting
two distinct, four-part tests, one related to intelligence information,
the other to international law. The essence of the two tests-and of
lawful preemptive self-defense-is that the intended target is
involved in planning and implementing a future action;
international law does not-and must not-tolerate revenge-based
counterterrorism predicated

on retribution.

Developing and

implementing the two distinct, four-part tests directly facilitates-in

both the targeted-killing and drone-attacks paradigms-minimizing
the loss of innocent life and maximizing the accuracy of the

Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm;
Kenneth Anderson,
Targeted Killing in U.S. CounterterrorismStrategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON
TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
15. See, e.g., STEVEN R. DAVID, FATAL CHOICES: ISRAEL'S POLICY OF TARGETED
KILLINGS (The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University,
Mideast Security and
Policy Studies No. 51,
2002),
available at
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/david.pdf; Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli,
justice-Ability: A Critique of the Non-Justiciability of Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 368 (2003); David Kretzmer Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists:
Extra-JudicialExecutions or Legitimate Means ofDefence?, 16 EUR.J. INT'L L. 171 (2005);
NILS MELTZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2008).
16. Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L
L. 319, 334 (2004) (cited by the Israel Supreme Court in HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm.
Against Torture in Isr. vs. Gov't of Isr. [2005] and HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess vs.
Government of Israel [2008]); Amos N. Guiora, License to Kil1l FOREIGN POL'Y (July
at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009
available
13,
2009),
/07/13/licence_tokill; Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killings, WORLD (July 15, 2009),
http://www.theworld.org/2009/07/15/targeted-killings.
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proposed action.
Intelligence information (gathering/analysis) is the heart and
soul of operational counterterrorism (money being essential to
terrorism); for the received information to be deemed actionable
(meaning its use is justified), it must meet a four-part test:
1. Reliable: Past experiences show the source to be a
dependable provider of correct information; requires
discerning whether the information is useful and
accurate; demands analysis by the case officer whether
the source has a personal agenda/grudge with respect
to the person identified/targeted.
2. Viable: Is it possible that an attack could occur in
accordance with the source's information? The
information provided by the source indicates a
terrorist attack that could take place within the realm
of possibility and is feasible.
3. Relevant: The information has bearing on upcoming
events; consider both the timeliness of the
information and whether it is time-sensitive, which
could
necessitate
imposing
immediate
counterterrorism measures.
4. Corroborated: Another source (who meets the
reliability test above) confirms the information in
whole or in part.
With respect to international law, the proposed action must
meet the following criteria:
1. Proportionality: requires that the anticipated loss of
life and damage to property incident to attacks must
not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained from the
proposed action;
2. Military Necessity: justifies those measures not
forbidden by international law, and which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of
the enemy as soon as possible; 8
3. Alternatives: targeted killing is impermissible when
there is a "non-lethal alternative which would entail a
comparable military advantage without unreasonably
17.

INCENDIARY WEAPONS

-

LEGAL STATUS,

/military/systems/munitions/incendiary-legal.htm
18. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/5

http://www.globalsecurity.org
(last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
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increasing the risk to the operating forces or the
,, 19
civilian population";
4. Collateral Damage: inadvertent casualties and
destruction inflicted on civilians in the course of
military operations.
The Israel Supreme Court (sitting as the High Court ofJustice,
President Barak) ruling regarding targeted killings establishes clear
criteria-a checklist for operational counterterrorism decision
making-with respect to targeted killing. Harming civilians that
[take direct part in hostilities], even if the result is death,
is permitted, on the condition that there is no other less
harmful means, and on the condition that innocent
civilians nearby are not harmed. Harm to the latter must
be proportionate. That proportionality is determined
according to a values based test, intended to balance
between the military advantage and the civilian damage.o
This guideline approach, predicated on checklists maximizing
rationale-based decision making, is intended to minimize
unnecessary harm to innocent civilians who neither directly nor
indirectly participate in hostilities. The following charts suggest the
issues to be considered and weighed in the targeted-killing decision
making process:

*
*

*

Source
What is the source's background and how does that affect the
information provided?
Does the source have a grudge/personal score to settle based
either on past personal or family relationship with the
person the information targets/identifies?
Who is the target of the source's information?
.* What is the person's role in the terrorist
organization?

19. William Abresch, Book Review, GLOBAL LAw BooKs - TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw, http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/detail.asp?id=529
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011)
INTERNATIONAL LAw (2008)).

(reviewing

NILS MELZER,

TARGETED

KILLING IN

20. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. vs. Gov't of Isr. [2005] [
60, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011). See Appendix B for charts showing legitimate targets
killed versus innocent civilians killed in U.S. targeted drone strikes in Pakistan.
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How will detention affect that organization, shortterm and long-term alike?
* What insight can the source provide regarding
impact?
* What are the risks to the source if the targeted individual is
targeted?
* Source protection is essential to continued and
effective intelligence gathering;
* Protecting the source is essential both with respect
to that source and additional-present or futuresources
* What are the risks to the source if the intelligence is made
public?
* Key to determining the proper forum for trying
suspected terrorists;
If protecting the source/information gathering methods and
techniques takes precedence over the traditional right guaranteed
to the defendant to confront his accuser, an alternative judicial
forum must be considered.
*

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/5
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Target
* For example, in the suicide bombing infrastructure, there are
four distinct actors: the bomber, the logistician, the planner,
and the financier; determining the legitimacy of the target (for
a targeted killing) requires ascertaining the potential target's
specific role in the infrastructure. Subject to the two, four-part
tests above, the four actors are legitimate targets as follows:
(a) Planner-legitimate target 24/7;
(b) Bomber-legitimate target solely when operationally
engaged;
(c) Logistician-legitimate target when involved in all aspects
of implementing a suicide bombing but-unlike the
planner-not a legitimate target when not involved in
specific, future attack;
(d) Financier-a largely unexplored subject in the context of
targeted killings; a legitimate target when involved in-for
example-wiring money or laundering money (both
essential for terrorist attacks) but subject to debate and
discussion regarding when "not in the act." To that extent,
the question is whether the financier is more akin to the
bomber or to the logistician. Arguably, given the centrality
of the financier's role the correct placing is between the
logistician and planner.
* What are the risks/cost-benefits if the targeted killing is
delayed?
* How time-sensitive is the source's information;
* Does itjustify immediate action;
* Or is the information insufficient to justify a targeted killing
but significant enough to justify other measures, including
detention (subject to operational considerations);
* What is the nature of the suspicious activity?
* Does the information suggest involvement in significant acts
of terrorism justifying immediate counterterrorism
measures;
* Or is the information more suggestive than concrete;
* In addition, if the information is indicative of minor/not
harmful possible action, effective counterterrorism might
suggest additional information gathering-same or
additional source-before authorization of the targetedkilling.
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What information can the individual provide? (premised on
the operational feasibility of detention rather than
authorizing a targeted killing)
Does the individual possess information, to varying degrees of
specificity, relevant to future acts of terrorism/individuals?

Appendix B
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: 2004-2010
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Estimated Total Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes
in Pakistan: 2004- 2011
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